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All the papers in this volume (like those in its predecessor —the monographic section 
that I edited for Theoria in 2000 entitled Causality in Physics)1 are original contributions 
to a set of issues that lie at the cutting-edge of philosophical research. They have been 
contributed especially for this issue of Theoria, and have not been previously published 
anywhere else. The issues that they deal with —and the methods employed in doing 
so— are at the forefront of philosophical research in the world at large —and in par-
ticular in the anglophone world. With all probability these papers will be cited and re-
ferred to in years to come by other authors and in other essays published in other 
similarly prestigious journals. 
 Neither is this a mottled collection or assortment of papers put together with the 
only aim of publication. Just like those papers in its predecessor volume, the papers 
appear here together for a reason: they complement each other well, for they deal with 
the same set of issues from different perspectives, and they have been written attend-
ing to that common set of issues. Alexander Bird (“Antidotes all the way down?”) re-
views the literature on the conditional analysis of dispositions, and the problems and 
difficulties that arise when “finks” and “antidotes” are considered. He finds that finks 
are not as problematic for a conditional analysis of fundamental dispositions (i.e. those 
dispositions that there is no further set of categorical properties that they could be re-
duced to). Can antidotes be similarly eliminated? Bird shows that on a natural analysis, 
antidotes generally give rise to ceteris paribus laws. Hence if it could be shown that 
fundamental dispositions do not suffer from antidotes, we would then be able to con-
clude that the fundamental laws of physics are not ceteris paribus laws. He ends by of-
fering some arguments to that effect. 
 My contribution (“Causal Processes and Propensities in Quantum Mechanics”) is 
an analysis of Van Fraassen’s 1982 argument against common cause models for the 
EPR correlations, which several commentators have taken to refute causal realism. I 
find that far from refuting causal realism, this argument actually provides an excellent 
guide to the different possible causal accounts of EPR. I then go on to show how to 
use the different causal models in order to develop different accounts of quantum 
propensities. Some of the quantum features of these propensities, such as their “non-
locality” might add grist to Bird’s mill on finks and antidotes at the fundamental level.  
 Alice Drewery (“A Note on Science and Essentialism”) provides arguments against 
the view that there are metaphysically necessary laws —grounded on the essential dis-
positional properties of fundamental entities— that can be empirically discovered by 
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science. Her conclusion points towards a dilemma: either there are such laws —
grounded upon fundamental dispositional properties— but science cannot empirically 
discover the necessary character of such laws; or the entities are not themselves fun-
damental and there is another layer of yet more fundamental entities —a fact that sci-
ence could discover. But if the latter, Drewery’s argument could, presumably, be re-
applied at this more fundamental level.  
 All the papers in this volume share a belief in (at the very least the possibility of) ir-
reducible dispositions —or propensities— at the fundamental level. But Agustín 
Vicente (“The Role of Dispositions in Explanations”) argues further that the appeal to 
dispositional properties might turn out to be essential in teleological explanations even 
if these properties are predicated of, presumably non-fundamental entities, such as 
psychological or biological properties. He points out that even if the dispositional or 
functional properties in those sciences could be reduced to categorial properties, the 
explanations couched in dispositional terms might not be dispensible. Dispositional 
properties thus have non-dispensible explanatory power even when they can be re-
duced to some categorial basis.  
 Finally, Nicholas Maxwell (“Does Probabilism Solve the Great Quantum Mys-
tery?”) provides an introduction and state-of-the-art summary of his long standing and 
well-known propensiton interpretation of quantum mechanics. He criticises the or-
thodox interpretation of quantum mechanics (the Copenhagen interpretation) for not 
being committed enough to the idea that quantum entities interact in probabilistic 
fashion and develops his own alternative. 
 We all met to discuss these issues together at a workshop which took place at the 
Instituto de Filosofía in the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas in Madrid 
on 15th December 2003. The symposium was organised under the umbrella of the re-
search network “Causality, Determinism and Probability in Quantum Mechanics and 
Relativity Theory”, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (Science 
and Technology) with reference BFF2002-01552. I would like to thank the Instituto 
de Filosofía for making their venue available for the occasion, and particularly Eulalia 
Pérez Sedeño for hosting us. 
 Most of the papers collected here were presented at the workshop, and we have all 
had the opportunity to discuss these issues between us, and with several other inter-
ested participants —at the time of the symposium and later on over email. I would 
like to thank all the participants at the symposium, who came from all over Spain and 
England. In particular many thanks to those who offered to chair the sessions 
(Manuel García-Carpintero, José Díez, Carl Hoefer, Iñaki San Pedro). I also would 
like to thank the other members of the research network BFF2002-01552 (Carl Hoe-
fer, Iñaki San Pedro, Henrik Zinkernagel) for their unfailing support over the last 
couple of years, and for their very active participation and help during the workshop. 
Thanks are also due to my co-guest editor, Alexander Bird. Finally I would like to ac-
knowledge the support and encouragement of the Theoria team, and in particular its 
editor-in-chief Andoni Ibarra, and to thank him for the patience and care taken in 
producing this monographic section. 
 
